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Abstract
We draw a new connection between Coppersmith’s method for finding small solutions to polynomial
congruences modulo integers and the capacity theory of adelic subsets of algebraic curves. Coppersmith’s
method uses lattice basis reduction to construct an auxiliary polynomial that vanishes at the desired
solutions. Capacity theory provides a toolkit for proving when polynomials with certain boundedness
properties do or do not exist. Using capacity theory, we prove that Coppersmith’s bound for univariate
polynomials is optimal in the sense that there are no auxiliary polynomials of the type he used that
would allow finding roots of size N1/d+ǫ for monic degree-d polynomials modulo N . Our results rule out
the existence of polynomials of any degree and do not rely on lattice algorithms, thus eliminating the
possibility of even superpolynomial-time improvements to Coppersmith’s bound. We extend this result
to constructions of auxiliary polynomials using binomial polynomials, and rule out the existence of any
auxiliary polynomial of this form that would find solutions of size N1/d+ǫ unless N has a very small
prime factor.
1 Introduction
Coppersmith’s method [Cop97, Cop01] is a celebrated technique in public-key cryptanalysis for finding
small roots of polynomial equations modulo integers. In the simplest case, one is given a degree-d monic
polynomial f(x) with integer coefficients, and one wishes to find the integers r modulo a given integer N for
which f(r) ≡ 0 mod N . When N is prime, this problem can be efficiently solved in polynomial time, but for
composite N of unknown factorization, no efficient method is known in general. In fact, such an algorithm
would immediately break the RSA cryptosystem, by allowing one to decrypt ciphertexts c by finding roots
of the polynomial f(x) = xe − c mod N .
While it appears intractable to solve this problem in polynomial time, Coppersmith showed that one can
efficiently find all small integers r such that f(r) ≡ 0 mod N . More precisely, he proved the following result
in [Cop97]:
Theorem 1 (Coppersmith 1996). Suppose one is given a modulus N and a monic polynomial f(x) =
xd + fd−1x
d−1 + · · ·+ f1x+ f0 in Z[x]. One can find all r ∈ Z such that
|r| ≤ N1/d and f(r) ≡ 0 mod N (1)
in polynomial time in log(N) +
∑
i log |fi|.
The algorithm he developed to prove this result has applications across public-key cryptography, including
cryptanalysis of low public exponent RSA with fixed-pattern or affine padding [Cop97], the security proof of
RSA-OAEP [Sho01], and showing that the least significant bits of RSA are hardcore [SPW06]. We discuss
these applications in more detail in §2.3. If the exponent 1/d in the bound in Equation 1 could be increased,
it would have immediate practical impact on the security of a variety of different cryptosystems.
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In followup work, [Cop01, §4] Coppersmith speculates about possible improvements of this exponent 1/d.
The main conclusion of [Cop01, §4] is that “We have tried to abuse this method to obtain information that
should otherwise be hard to get, and we always fail.” Later, the hardness of finding roots of f(x) of size
N1/d+ǫ for ǫ > 0 was formalized as a concrete cryptographic hardness assumption [SPW06].
Coppersmith’s proof of Theorem 1 relies on constructing a polynomial h(x) such that any small integer r
satisfying f(r) ≡ 0 mod N is a root of h(x) over the integers. He finds such an auxiliary polynomial h(x) by
constructing a basis for a lattice of polynomials, and then by using the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz lattice basis
reduction algorithm [LLL82] to find a “small” polynomial in this lattice. The smallness condition ensures
that any small integer r satisfying f(r) ≡ 0 mod N must be a root of h(x). The algorithm then checks which
rational roots r of h(x) have the desired properties.
Our Results. In this paper, our main result is that one cannot increase the exponent 1/d in Coppersmith’s
theorem by using auxiliary polynomials of the kind he considers. This eliminates possible improvements to
the method using improvements in lattice algorithms or shortest vector bounds. We obtain our results by
drawing a new connection between this family of cryptographic techniques and results from the capacity
theory of adelic subsets of algebraic curves. We will use fundamental results of Cantor [Can80] and Rumely
[Rum89, Rum13] about capacity theory to prove several results about such polynomials.
In particular, we will prove in Theorem 13 a stronger form of the following result. This result shows that
there are no polynomials of the type used by Coppersmith that could lead to an improvement of the bound
in (1) from N1/d to N1/d+ǫ for any ǫ > 0.
Theorem 2 (Optimality of Coppersmith’s Theorem). Suppose ǫ > 0. There does not exist a non-zero
polynomial h(x) ∈ Q[x] of the form
h(x) =
∑
i,j≥0
ai,j x
i (f(x)/N)j (2)
with ai,j ∈ Z such that |h(z)| < 1 for all z in the complex disk {z ∈ C : |z| ≤ N (1/d)+ǫ}. Furthermore, if
ǫ > ln(2)/ ln(N) there is no such h(x) such that |h(z)| < 1 for all z in the real interval [−N1/d+ǫ, N1/d+ǫ].
Note that in order for Coppersmith’s method to run in polynomial time, h(x) should have degree bounded
by a polynomial in ln(N). Theorem 2 says that when ǫ > 0 there are no polynomials of any degree satisfying
the stated bounds. We can thus eliminate the possibility of an improvement to this method with even
superpolynomial running time.
In [Cop01], Coppersmith already noted that it did not appear possible to improve the exponent 1/d in his
result by searching for roots in the real interval [−N1/d+ǫ, N1/d+ǫ] instead of in the complex disk of radius
N1/d+ǫ. The last statement in Theorem 2 quantifies this observation, since ln(2)/ ln(N)→ 0 as N →∞.
Coppersmith also notes that since the binomial polynomials
bi(x) = x · (x− 1) · · · (x − i+ 1)/i!
take integral values on integers, one could replace xi in (2) by bi(x) and (f(x)/N)
j by bj(f(x)/N). Copper-
smith observed (backed up by experiments) that this leads to a small improvement on the size of the root
that can be found, and a speedup for practical computations. The improvement is proportional to the degree
of the auxiliary polynomial h(x) that is constructed, and is thus limited for a polynomial-time algorithm.
We show that the exponent 1/d in Coppersmith’s theorem still cannot be improved using binomial
polynomials, but for a different reason. Our results come in two parts. First, we show that the exact
analogue of Theorem 2 is false in the case of integral combinations of binomial polynomials. In fact, there
are such combinations that have all the properties required in the proof of Coppersmith’s theorem. The
problem is that these polynomials have very large degree, and in fact, they vanish at every small integer,
not just the solutions of the congruence. This is formalized in the following theorem, which is a simplified
version of Theorem 19.
Theorem 3 (Existence of binomial auxiliary polynomials). Suppose δ is any positive real number. For all
sufficiently large integers N there is a non-zero polynomial of the form h(x) =
∑
i ai bi(x) with ai ∈ Z such
that |h(z)| < 1 for all z in the complex disk {z ∈ C : |z| ≤ N δ}.
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Second, we show that the existence of these polynomials still does not permit cryptographically useful
improvements to Coppersmith’s bound beyond N1/d. This is because if one is able to use binomial polyno-
mials of small degree to obtain such an improvement, then the modulus N must have a small prime factor.
In that case, it would have been more efficient to factor N and use the factorization to find the roots. More
precisely, we will show in Theorem 21 a stronger form of the following result:
Theorem 4 (Negative Coppersmith Theorem for binomial polynomials). Suppose ǫ > 0 and that M and N
are integers with 1.48774N ǫ ≥M ≥ 319. If there is a non-zero polynomial h(x) of the form
h(x) =
∑
0≤i,j≤M
ai,j bi(x) bj(f(x)/N) (3)
with ai,j ∈ Z such that |h(z)| < 1 for z in the complex disk {z ∈ C : |z| ≤ N1/d+ǫ}, then N must have a
prime factor less than or equal to M . In particular, this will be the case for all large N if we let M = ln(N)c
for some fixed integer c > 0.
Note that the integer M quantifies “smallness” in Theorem 4 in two ways. First, it is a bound on the
degree of the binomial polynomials that are allowed to be used to create auxiliary polynomials. But then if
a useful auxiliary polynomial exists, then N must have a factor of size less than or equal to M . As a special
case of Theorem 4, if N = pq is an RSA modulus with two large equal sized prime factors, then any auxiliary
polynomial of the form in (3) that can find roots of size N1/d+ǫ must involve binomial terms with i or j at
least 1.48774N ǫ.
Note that Coppersmith’s theorem in its original form is not sensitive to whether or not N has small
prime factors. Theorem 4 shows that the existence of useful auxiliary polynomials does depend on whether
N has such small factors.
The paper is organized in the following way. In §2.1 we begin by recalling Coppersmith’s algorithm for
finding small solutions of polynomial congruences. In §2.3 we recall some mathematical hardness assumptions
and we discuss their connection to the security of various cryptosystems and Coppersmith’s algorithm. In
§3 we review some basic notions from algebraic number theory, and we recall some results of Cantor [Can80]
and Rumely [Rum89, Rum13] on which our work is based. At the end of §3 we prove Theorem 13, which
implies Theorem 2. We state and prove Theorem 19 and Theorem 21 in §4; these imply Theorem 3 and
Theorem 4. One of the goals of this paper is to provide a framework for using capacity theory to show when
these auxiliary polynomials do or do not exist. We give an outline in §5 of how one proves these types of
results. In the conclusion we summarize the implications of our results and discuss possible directions for
future research.
2 Background and Related Work
Given a polynomial f(x) = xd + fd−1x
d−1 + · · ·+ f1x+ f0 ∈ Z[x] and a prime p we can find solutions x ∈ Z
to the equation
f(x) ≡ 0 mod p (4)
in randomized polynomial time using e.g. Berlekamp’s algorithm or the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm [Ber67,
CZ81]. While it is “easy” to find roots of f(x) in the finite field Z/pZ and over Z as well, there is no known
efficient method to find roots of f(x) modulo N for large composite integers N unless one knows the
factorization of N .
2.1 Coppersmith’s method
Although finding roots of a univariate polynomial, f(x), modulo N is difficult in general, if f(x) has a
“small” root, then this root can be found efficiently using Coppersmith’s method [Cop97].
Coppersmith’s method for proving Theorem 1 works as follows. We follow the exposition in [Cop01],
which incorporates simplifications due to Howgrave-Graham [HG97]. Suppose ǫ > 0 and that f(x) has a
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root r ∈ Z with |r| ≤ N (1/d)−ǫ and f(r) ≡ 0 mod N . He considers the finite rank lattice L of rational
polynomials in Q[x] of the form
hij(x) =
∑
0≤i+dj<t
ai,j x
i (f(x)/N)j
where t ≥ 0 is an integer parameter to be varied and all ai,j ∈ Z. Here L is a finite rank lattice because the
denominators of the coefficients of hij(x) are bounded and hij(x) has degree bounded by t.
If we evaluate any polynomial hij ∈ L at a root r satisfying f(r) ≡ 0 mod N , hij(r) will be an integer.
Concretely, one picks a basis for a sublattice of L ∈ Qt−1 by taking a suitable set of polynomials {hij(x)}i,j
and representing each polynomial by its coefficient vector. Coppersmith’s method applies the LLL algorithm
to this sublattice basis to find a short vector representing a specific polynomial, hǫ(x) in L. He shows that
the fact that the vector of coefficients representing hǫ(x) is short implies that |hǫ(x)| < 1 for all x ∈ C with
|x| ≤ N (1/d)−ǫ, and that for sufficiently large t, the LLL algorithm will find a short enough vector. Because
hǫ(x) is an integral combination of terms of the form x
i (f(x)/N)j , this forces h(r) ∈ Z because f(r)/N ∈ Z.
But |r| ≤ N (1/d)−ǫ forces |hǫ(r)| < 1. Because 0 is the only integer less than 1 in absolute value, we see
hǫ(r) = 0. So r is among the zeros of hǫ(x), and as discussed earlier, there is an efficient method to find the
integer zeros of a polynomial in Q[x]. One then lets ǫ→ 0 and does a careful analysis of the computational
complexity of this method.
The bound in Theorem 1 arises from cleverly choosing a subset of the possible {hij} as a lattice basis so
that one can bound the determinant of the lattice as tightly as possible, then using the LLL algorithm in a
black-box way on the resulting lattice basis.
2.2 Optimality of Coppersmith’s Theorem
Since Coppersmith’s technique uses the LLL algorithm [LLL82] to find the specific polynomial h(x) in the
lattice L, it is natural to think that improvements in lattice reduction techniques or improved bounds on
the length of the shortest vector in certain lattices might improve the bound N1/d in Theorem 1.
Such an improvement would be impossible in polynomial time for arbitrary N , since the polynomial
f(x) = xd has exponentially many roots modulo N = pd of absolute value N1/d+ǫ, but this does not rule out
the possibility of improvements for cases of cryptographic interest, such as polynomial congruences modulo
RSA moduli N = pq.
Aono, Agrawal, Satoh, and Watanabe [AASW12] showed that Coppersmith’s lattice basis construction is
optimal under the heuristic assumption that the lattice behaves as a random lattice; however they left open
whether improved lattice bounds or a non-lattice-based approach to solving this problem could improve the
N1/d bound.
2.3 Cryptanalytic Applications of Coppersmith’s Theorem
Theorem 1 has many immediate applications to cryptanalysis, particularly the cryptanalysis of RSA. May [May07]
gives a comprehensive survey of cryptanalytic applications of Coppersmith’s method. In this paper, we focus
on Coppersmith’s method applied to univariate polynomials modulo integers. We highlight several applica-
tions of the univariate case below.
The RSA assumption posits that it is computationally infeasible to invert the map x 7→ xd mod N , i.e.,
it is infeasible to find roots of f(x) = xd − c mod N . Because of their similar structure, almost all of the
cryptographically hard problems (some of which are outlined below) based on factoring can be approached
using Coppersmith’s method (Theorem 1).
Low public exponent RSA with stereotyped messages: A classic example listed in Coppersmith’s
original paper [Cop97] is decrypting “stereotyped” messages encrypted under low public exponent RSA,
where an approximation to the solution is known in advance. The general RSA map is x 7→ xe mod N . For
efficiency purposes, e can be chosen to be as small as 3, so that a “ciphertext” is c0 = x
3
0 mod N . Suppose
we know some approximation to the message x˜0 to the message x0. Then we can set
f(x) = (x˜0 + x)
3 − c.
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Thus f(x) has a root (modulo N) at x = x0 − x˜0. If |x0 − x˜0| < N (1/3) then this root can be found using
Coppersmith’s method.
Security of RSA-OAEP The RSA function x 7→ xe mod N is assumed to be a one-way trapdoor per-
mutation. Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) is a general method for taking a one-way
trapdoor permutation and a random oracle [BR93], and creating a cryptosystem that achieves security
against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA security).
Instantiating the OAEP protocol with the RSA one-way function yields RSA-OAEP – a standard cryp-
tosystem. When the public exponent is e = 3, Shoup used Coppersmith’s method to show that RSA-OAEP
is secure against an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (in the random oracle model) [Sho01].
Roughly, the proof of security works as follows. Suppose there is a distinguisher for the IND-CCA
security of the RSA-OAEP cryptosystem. Then, given a y ≡ x3 mod N , there is an adversary that can use
this distinguisher to extract an approximation x˜ for x. Then, using Coppersmith’s method, the adversary
can recover x. Since the RSA function is assumed to be one-way, there can be no such adversary, thus there
can be no such distinguisher. Unfortunately, since Coppersmith’s method requires |x˜−x| < N1/e, this proof
only goes through when e is small.
Hard-core bits of the RSA Function Repeated iteration of the RSA function has been proposed as
candidate for a pseudo random generator. In particular, we can create a stream of pseudo random bits by
picking an initial “seed”, x0 and calculating the series
xi 7→ xi+1
xi 7→ xei mod N
At each iteration, the generator will output the r least significant bits of xi. For efficiency reasons, we would
like r to be as large as possible while still maintaining the provable security of the generator.
When we output only 1 bit per iteration, this was shown to be secure [ACGS88, FS00], and later this was
increased to allow the generator to output any log log(N) consecutive bits [HN04]. The maximum number
of bits that can be safely outputted by such a generator is tightly tied to the approximation x˜ necessary for
recovering x from xe mod N . Thus a bound on our ability to find small roots of f(x) = (x− x˜)e − c mod N
immediately translates into bounds on the maximum number of bits that can be safely outputted at each
step of the RSA pseudo random generator.
In order to construct a provably secure pseudo random generator that outputs Ω(n) pseudo random bits
for each multiplication modulo N [SPW06] assume there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm for
solving the
(
1
d + ǫ, d
)
-SSRSA problem.
Definition 5 (The (δ, d)-SSRSA Problem [SPW06]). Given a random n bit RSA modulus, N and a poly-
nomial f(x) ∈ Z[x] with deg(f) = d, find a root x0 such that |x0| < N δ.
Coppersmith’s method solves the
(
1
d , d
)
-SSRSA Problem. Our results show that Coppersmith’s method
cannot be used to solve the
(
1
d + ǫ, d
)
-SSRSA problem. Note that our results do not show the
(
1
d + ǫ, d
)
-
SSRSA problem is intractable—doing so would imply there is no polynomial-time algorithm for factoring—
but instead we show that the best available class of techniques cannot be extended.
Finding Small Roots of Polynomial Equations in Theoretic Cryptography Coppersmith’s method
has led to a number of successful cryptanalytic attacks on the RSA cryptosystem (outlined above), but
Coppersmith’s method can also be applied to a variety of other factoring based cryptosystems that are
common in the cryptographic literature. Indeed, Coppersmith’s method provides the best known approaches
to breaking these cryptosystems, but their security has not been as extensively investigated as that of RSA
because they are not as widely deployed.
Below, we list a number of other well-known cryptosystems that are susceptible to similar attacks to
those described above. Although the problems listed below are all still believed to be hard in general, setting
parameters to ensure security requires a rigorous understanding of the best attacks, and their limitations.
The Quadratic Residuosity (QR) assumption [GM84] assumes that the set of quadratic residues modulo
N is indistinguishable from the set of elements with Jacobi symbol 1. This assumption essentially states
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that not only is it infeasible to find roots of f(x) = x2 − a mod N , it is infeasible to decide whether such an
equation even has a root.
The Benaloh and Naccache-Stern cryptosystems [Ben94, NS98] extend the QR assumption to higher
degree polynomials. Specifically, they assume that if N = pq, and there is an r > 1 with r|p− 1, then there
is no polynomial time algorithm that can distinguish the uniform distribution on the subgroup of rth powers
modulo N from the uniform distribution on the entire multiplicative group. Given a value a ∈ (Z/NZ)∗,
then the polynomial f(x) = xr − a has a root modulo N if and only if a is an rth power. Thus finding an
algorithm that could find a root of f would lead to a distinguisher.
The Okamato-Uchiyama cryptosystem [OU98] works with moduli of the form N = p2q, and the authors
assume that there is no polynomial time algorithm that can distinguish random samples from the set of pth
powers modulo N from uniform elements in the multiplicative group modulo N . Since p|N , any algorithm
that could find roots of f(x) = xN − a mod N would break the security of this cryptosystem.
The security of the Paillier Cryptosystem [Pai99] rests on the Decisional Composite Residuosity assump-
tion (DCR), which is the assumption that there is no polynomial time algorithm that can distinguish the
uniform distribution on Nth powers in Z/NZ from uniform elements in (Z/NZ)∗. Thus any algorithm that
finds roots of f(x) = xN − a mod N2 would break the security of this cryptosystem. Because of its ho-
momorphic properties, the Paillier Cryptosystem is a building block for many cryptographic protocols e.g.
private searching on streaming data [OS07] and private information retrieval [Cha04, Lip05].
2.3.1 Extensions to Coppersmith’s method
Coppersmith’s original work also considered the problem of finding small solutions to polynomial equations
in two variables over the integers and applied his results to the problem of factoring RSA moduli N = pq
when half of the most or least significant bits of one of the factors p is known. [Cop97] Howgrave-Graham
gave an alternate formulation of this problem by finding approximate common divisors of integers using
similar lattice-based techniques, and obtained the same bounds for factoring with partial information. [HG01]
May [May10] gives a unified formulation of Coppersmith and Howgrave-Graham’s results to find small
solutions to polynomial equations modulo unknown divisors of integers. Later work by Jutla [Jut98] and
Jochemsz and May [JM06] has generalized Coppersmith’s method to multivariate equations, and Herrmann
and May [HM08] obtained results for multivariate equations modulo divisors.
As we will show in the next section, existing results in capacity theory can be used to directly address
the case of auxiliary polynomials for Coppersmith’s method for univariate polynomials modulo integers.
Adapting these results to the other settings of Coppersmith’s method listed above is a direction for future
research.
3 Capacity Theory for Cryptographers
In this section, we use arithmetic capacity theory to prove our main results. Classically, capacity theory
arose from the following problem in electrostatics. How will a unit charge distribute itself so as to minimize
potential energy if it is constrained to lie within a compact subset E∞ of C which is stable under complex
conjugation?
It was discovered by Fekete and Szego˝ [Fek23, FS55] that the distribution of small charges on such an E
is related to the possible locations of zeros of monic integral polynomials. Heuristically, these zeros behave
in the same way as unit charges that repel one another according to an inverse power law. This is due to the
restriction that the discriminant of a monic integral polynomial without multiple zeros must be a non-zero
integer, which prevents all the zeros from being too close to one another. More precisely, the total potential
energy of the charges behaves as the negative of the logarithm of the absolute value of the discriminant of the
above polynomial. Both are sums over distinct pairs of charges (roots) at positions w and z of − ln |z − w|.
Since the discriminant of the polynomial has absolute value at least 1, the potential energy is not positive.
This heuristic is behind the following striking result of Fekete and Szego˝ from [Fek23, FS55]. Define the
capacity γ(E∞) to be e
−V (E∞), where V (E∞) is the so-called Robbin’s constant giving the minimal potential
energy of a unit charge distribution on E∞. Fekete and Szego˝ showed that if γ(E∞) < 1, then there are
only finitely many irreducible monic polynomials with integer coefficients which have all of their roots in
E∞. This corresponds to the case in which the minimal potential energy V (E∞) is positive, consistent with
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the above heuristic. Conversely, if γ(E∞) > 1, then for every open neighborhood U of E∞ in C, there are
infinitely many irreducible monic polynomials with integer coefficients having all their roots in U .
The work of Fekete and Szego˝ was vastly generalized by Cantor [Can80] to adelic subsets of the projective
line, and by Rumely [Rum89, Rum13] to adelic subsets of arbitrary smooth projective curves over global
fields. Their methods are based on potential theory, as in electrostatics. In [Chi91], Chinburg suggested a
simpler approach, called sectional capacity theory, which applies to arbitrary regular projective varieties of
any dimension and not just to curves. Sectional capacity theory was based on ideas from Arakelov theory,
with the geometry of numbers and Minkowski’s theorem being the primary tools. In [RLV00], Rumely, Lau
and Varley showed that the limits hypothesized in [Chi91] do exist under reasonable hypotheses; this is a
deep result.
This paper is the first application of capacity theory that we are aware of to cryptography. We will
show that capacity theory is very suited to studying the kind of auxiliary polynomials used in the proof of
Coppersmith’s theorem. Before we begin, however, we review some number theory.
3.1 p-adic Numbers
For any prime p, and any n ∈ Z, we define the p-adic valuation of n, to be the supremum of the integers e
such that pe|n, i.e.,
vp(n) =
{
max {e ∈ Z : pe | n} if n 6= 0
∞ if n = 0
This is then extended to rational numbers in the natural way. If a, b ∈ Z and a, b 6= 0, then
vp
(a
b
)
= vp(a)− vp(b).
The p-adic valuation gives rise to a p-adic absolute value | |p : Q→ R given by
|x|p =
{
p−vp(x) if x 6= 0 ,
0 if x = 0 .
(5)
It is straightforward to check that the p-adic absolute value is multiplicative and satisfies a stronger form of
the triangle inequality:
|xy|p = |x|p · |y|p and |x+ y|p ≤ max
(
|x|p , |y|p
)
for x, y ∈ Q. (6)
The p-adic absolute value defines a metric on Q. The p-adic numbers, Qp, are defined to be the completion
of Q with respect to this metric. This is similar to the construction of R as the completion of Q with respect
to the Euclidean absolute value | | : Q→ R.
Elements of Qp are either 0 or expressed in a unique way as a formal infinite sum
∞∑
i=k
aip
i
in which k ∈ Z, each ai lies in {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} and ak 6= 0. Such a sum converges to an element of Qp
because the sequence of integers {sj}∞j=k defined by sj =
∑j
i=k aip
i forms a Cauchy sequence with respect to
the metric | |p. One can add, subtract and multiply such sums by treating p as a formal variable, performing
operations in the resulting formal power series ring in one variable over Z, and by then carrying appropriately.
In fact, Qp is a field, since multiplication is commutative and it is possible to divide elements by non-zero
elements of Qp.
A field L is algebraically closed if every non-constant polynomial g(x) ∈ L[x] has a root in L. This implies
that g(x) factors into a product of linear polynomials in L[x], since one can find in L roots of quotients of
g(x) by products of previously found linear factors. For example, C is algebraically closed, but Q is certainly
not.
In general, given a field F there are many algebraically closed fields L containing F . For example, given
one such L, one could simply label the elements of L by the elements of some other set, or one could put
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L inside a larger algebraically closed field. Given one L, the set F of elements α ∈ L which are roots in L
of some polynomial in F [x] is called the algebraic closure of F in L. The set F is in fact an algebraically
closed field. For a given F , the algebraic closure F will depend on the algebraically closed field L which one
chooses in this construction. But if one were to use a different field L˜, say, then the algebraic closure of F
in L˜ is isomorphic to F by a (non-unique) isomorphism which is the identity on F . So we often just fix one
algebraic closure F of F .
For instance, if F = Q, then L = C is algebraically closed, so we can take Q to be the algebraic closure of
Q in C. The possible field embeddings τ : Q→ L = C come from pre-composing with a field automorphism
of Q.
However, for each prime p, there is another alternative. The field Qp is not algebraically closed, but as
noted above, we can find an algebraically closed field containing it and then construct the algebraic closure
Qp of Qp inside this field. Now we have Q ⊂ Qp ⊂ Qp, and Qp is algebraically closed. So we could take
L = Qp and consider the algebraic closure Q
′
of Q inside Qp. We noted above that all algebraic closures of Q
are isomorphic over Q in many ways. The possible isomorphisms of Q (as a subfield of C, for example) with
Q
′
(as a subfield of Qp) correspond to the field embeddings σ : Q→ Qp. Each such σ gives an isomorphism
of Q with Q
′
which is the identity map on Q. Note here that Qp is much larger than Q, since Qp (and in
fact Qp as well) is uncountable while Q is countable.
Each α ∈ Q is a root of a unique monic polynomial mα(x) ∈ Q[x] of minimal degree, and mα(x) is
irreducible. We will later need to discuss the image of such an α under all the field embeddings τ : Q → C
and under all field embeddings σ : Q → Qp as p varies. The possible values for τ(α) and σ(α) are simply
the different roots of mα(x) in C and Qp, respectively.
Example 6. If α =
√
7 then mα(x) = x
2 − 7. The possibilities for τ(α) are the positive real square root
2.64575... and the negative real square root −2.64575... of 7. When p = 3, it turns out that x2 − 7 already
has two roots α1 and α2 in the 3-adic numbers Q3 ⊂ Q3. These roots are
α1 = 1 + 1 · 3 + 1 · 32 + 0 · 33 + · · · and α2 = 2+ 1 · 3 + 1 · 32 + 2 · 33 + · · · .
These expansions result from choosing 3-adic digits so that the square of the right hand side of each equality
is congruent to 1 modulo an increasing power of 3. This is the 3-adic counterpart of finding the decimal
digits of the two real square roots of 7. So the possibilities for σ(α) under all embeddings σ : Q → Q3 are
α1 and α2.
Basic facts about integrality and divisibility are naturally encoded using p-adic absolute values:
Fact 7. As above, let Qp denote an algebraic closure of Qp. There is a unique extension of | |p : Qp → R to
an absolute value | |p : Qp → R for which (6) holds for all x, y ∈ Qp.
Fact 8. The set Z of algebraic integers is the set of all α ∈ Q for which mα(x) ∈ Z[x]. In fact, Z is a ring,
so that adding, subtracting and multiplying algebraic integers produces algebraic integers. One can speak
of congruences in Z by saying α ≡ β mod γZ if α− β = γ · δ for some δ ∈ Z.
Fact 9. If r ∈ Q then |r|p ≤ 1 for all primes p if and only if r ∈ Z. More generally, an element α ∈ Q is in
Z if and only if for all primes p and all field embeddings σ : Q→ Qp one has |σ(α)|p ≤ 1.
Fact 10. Suppose α ∈ Z and |τ(α)| < 1 for all embeddings τ : Q → C. Then in fact, α = 0. To see why,
note that mα(0) ∈ Z is ±1 times the product of the complex roots of mα(x). These roots all have the form
τ(α), so |mα(0)| < 1. Then mα(0) ∈ Z forces mα(0) = 0. Because mα(x) is monic and irreducible this
means mα(x) = x, so α = 0.
Fact 11. If N = pq for distinct primes p and q, then |N |p = 1p , |N |q = 1q , and |N |p′ = 1 for all other primes
p′.
Fact 12. If a, b ∈ Z, then
a|b ⇔ |b|p ≤ |a|p ∀p
Thus a|b is the statement that b is in the p-adic disc of radius |a|p centered at 0 for all p. More generally, if
α, β ∈ Z then α divides β in Z if β = δ ·α for some δ ∈ Z. This is so if and only if |σ(β))|p ≤ |σ(α))|p for all
primes p and all field embeddings σ : Q→ Qp.
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3.2 Auxiliary Functions
The original question Coppersmith considered was this: Given an integer N ≥ 1, a polynomial f(x), and a
bound X , can we find all integers z ∈ Z such that |z| ≤ X and f(z) ≡ 0 mod N?
When X is sufficiently small in comparison to N , Coppersmith constructed a non-zero auxiliary polyno-
mial of the form
h(x) =
∑
i,j
ai,jx
i(f(x)/N)j , ai,j ∈ Z (7)
satisfying |h(z)| < 1 for every z ∈ C with |z| ≤ X . As noted in Section 2.1, this boundedness property forces
the set of z ∈ Z satisfying |z| ≤ X and f(z) ≡ 0 mod N to be among the roots of h(x). In fact, the roots of
the h(x) include all algebraic integers z ∈ Z satisfying
f(z) ≡ 0 mod N · Z and |σ(z)| ≤ X for all embeddings σ : Q→ C. (8)
The reason is as follows. For z ∈ Z, the condition that f(z) ≡ 0 mod NZ is equivalent to the condition that
f(z)/N ∈ Z. Therefore, for any h(x) in the form of Equation 7, we have h(z) ∈ Z whenever f(z) ≡ 0 mod NZ.
If h(x) further satisfies |h(z)| < 1 for all z ∈ C with |z| ≤ X , then the property that |σ(z)| ≤ X for all
embeddings σ : Q→ C, means that |h(σ(z))| < 1 as well. Fact 10 therefore tells us that h(z) = 0.
Capacity theory can be used for solving the problem of deciding whether there exist non-zero auxiliary
polynomials h(x) which include among its roots the set of z ∈ Z satisfying Equation 8. The basic idea, which
will be given in detail in Section 3.3, is that capacity theory gives one a way of deciding whether the set of
algebraic integers satisfying Equation 8 is finite or infinite.
When this set is infinite then there cannot exist any rational function h(x) of any kind vanishing on the
z ∈ Z satisfying (8), and in particular no h(x) of the form in (7) will exist satisfying the desired properties. If,
on the other hand, this set is finite then there will exist an auxiliary polynomial h(x) vanishing on the z ∈ Z
satisfying (8), and in fact Coppersmith explicitly constructed such a polynomial using the LLL algorithm.
As we will see, the boundary for finite versus infinite occurs when X = N1/d where d is the degree of f(x).
3.3 When do Useful Auxiliary Polynomials Exist?
In this section, we use capacity theory to give a characterization of when auxiliary polynomials h(x) of the
kind discussed in §3.2 exist. We will use the work of Cantor in [Can80] to show the following result.
Theorem 13 (Existence of an auxiliary polynomial). Let d be the degree of f(x). Define S(X) to be the set
of all all algebraic integers z ∈ Z such that
f(z) = 0 mod NZ and |σ(z)| ≤ X for all embeddings σ : Q→ C.
There exists a polynomial h(x) ∈ Q[x] whose roots include every element of S(X) if X < N1/d. If X > N1/d
there is no rational function h(x) ∈ Q(x) whose zero set contains S(X) because S(X) is infinite.
We break the proof into a sequence of steps.
1. Since f(x) ∈ Z[x], and embeddings fix integers, then if z ∈ Z we have f(z) ∈ Z, and σ(f(x)) = f(σ(x))
for all embeddings σ : Q→ Qp.
2. Suppose N = pe11 · · · pekk and x ∈ Z, then by Fact 12
f(z) ≡ 0 mod N ⇔ |f(z)|pi ≤
(
1
pi
)ei
∀i ∈ [k]
⇔ |f(z)|pi ≤ |N |pi ∀i ∈ [k]
Similarly, if z ∈ Z then
f(z) = 0 mod NZ⇔ |σ(f(z))|pi = |f(σ(z))|pi ≤ |N |pi
for all i ∈ [k] and for all embeddings σ : Q→ Qp.
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3. For all primes, p, define the set of elements in Qp that solve the congruence in Equation 8 p-adically:
Ep
def
=
{
z ∈ Qp
∣∣∣ |f(z)|p ≤ |N |p
}
= f−1
({
z ∈ Qp
∣∣∣ |z|p ≤ |N |p
})
,
and similarly define the set of elements with bounded complex absolute value
E∞
def
= {z ∈ C | |z| ≤ X}
Let
E
def
= E∞ ×
∏
p∈primes
Ep
This specifies the set of p-adic and complex constraints on our solutions. We will compute the capacity
of E, a measurement of the size of E.
4. We now define the local capacities γp(Ep) and γ∞(E∞) as well as the global capacity γ(E). Suppose
0 ≤ r ∈ R. We have p-adic and complex discs of radius r defined by
Dp(a, r) =
{
z ∈ Qp
∣∣∣ |z − a|p ≤ r
}
for a ∈ Qp
and
D∞(a, r) = {z ∈ C | |z − a| ≤ r} for a ∈ C.
Fact 14 (Capacity of a Disc). For v = p and v =∞, one has local capacity
γv(Dv(a, r)) = r
If v = p, a = 0 and r = |N |p is the p-adic absolute value of an integer N ≥ 1, then Dv(0, |N |p) ∩ Zp is
just NZp. We will need later the fact that the p-adic capacity of NZp is
γp(NZp) = p
−1/(p−1)|N |p
In a similar way, suppose v =∞. The capacity of the real interval [−r, r] is
γ∞([−r, r]) = r/2
Fact 15 (Capacity of polynomial preimage). If f(x) ∈ Z[x] is a monic degree d polynomial, and S is
a subset of Qp if v = p or of C if v =∞ for which the capacity γv(S) is well defined, then γv(f−1(S))
is well defined and
γv
(
f−1(S)
)
= γv(S)
1/d
Facts 14 and 15 show that
γp(Ep) = γp(Dp(0, |N |p))1/d = |N |1/dp
and
γ∞(E∞) = γp(D∞(0, X)) = X
Fact 16 (Capacity of a product). If
S
def
= S∞ ×
∏
p∈primes
Sp
then
γ(S) = γ∞(S∞) ·
∏
p∈primes
γp(Sp)
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Fact 16 means
γ(E) = γ∞(E∞) ·
∏
p∈primes
γp(Ep)
= X ·
∏
p∈primes
|N |1/dp
= X ·
k∏
i=1
p
−ei/d
i
= X ·N−1/d
5. Computing the capacity of our sets of interest tells us whether there exists a polynomial mapping
the components of E into discs of radius 1. This allows us to apply the following theorem, due to
Cantor [Can80], which tells us when an auxiliary polynomial exists.
Theorem 17 (Existence of an auxiliary polynomial). If
E = E∞ ×
∏
p∈primes
Ep
then there exists a non-zero auxiliary polynomial h(x) ∈ Q[x] satisfying
h(Ep) ⊂ Dp(0, 1) ∀p
and
h(E∞) ⊂ {z ∈ C | |z| < 1}
if γ(E) < 1, and no such polynomial exists if γ(E) > 1.
Once we have set up this framework, we are now ready to prove Theorem 13.
Proof of Theorem 13. Suppose first that X < N1/d. Then by Fact 16, γ(E) < 1. By Fact 17, there exists
a polynomial h(x) ∈ Q[x] with |h(z)|p ≤ 1 for all p and z ∈ Ep, and |h(z)| < 1 for all z ∈ E∞. Suppose
z ∈ S(X). Then f(z)/N ∈ Z, so Fact 9 says that for all primes p and embeddings σ : Q→ Qp one has
|σ(f(z)/N)|p ≤ 1
Since f(x) ∈ Z[x] and N ∈ Z, we have σ(f(z)) = f(σ(z)) and σ(N) = N . So
|f(σ(z))|p = |σ(f(z))|p =
∣∣∣∣σ(f(z))σ(N)
∣∣∣∣
p
· |σ(N)|p = |σ(f(z)/N)|p · |N |p ≤ |N |p .
Therefore σ(z) ∈ Ep. Hence |h(σ(z))|p ≤ 1, where σ(h(z)) = h(σ(z)) since h(x) ∈ Q[x]. Because p was
an arbitrary prime, this means h(z) is an algebraic integer, i.e. h(z) ∈ Z by Fact 9. On the other hand,
z ∈ S(X) implies |σ(z)| ≤ X so |σ(h(z))| = |h(σ(z))| < 1 for all σ : Q→ C. Thus h(z) is an algebraic integer
such that |σ(h(z))| < 1 for all σ : Q → C, so by Fact 10, h(z) = 0 as claimed. When X > N1/d, S(X) is
infinite by [Can80, Thm 5.1.1].
To try to prove stronger results about small solutions of congruences, Coppersmith also considered
auxiliary polynomials which absolute value less than 1 on a real interval which is symmetric about 0. We
can quantify his observation that this does not lead to an improvement of the exponent 1/d in Theorem 1
by the following result.
Theorem 18. Let S′(X) be the subset of all z ∈ S(X) such that σ(z) lies in R for every embedding
σ : Q→ C. There exists a polynomial h(x) ∈ Q[x] whose roots include every element of S′(X) if X < 2N1/d.
If X > 2N1/d there is no non-zero rational function h(x) ∈ Q(x) whose zero set contains S′(X) because
S′(X) is infinite.
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Proof of Theorem 18. To prove the Theorem 18, one just replaces the complex disc E∞ = {z ∈ C : |z| ≤ X}
by the real interval E′∞ = {z ∈ R : |z| ≤ X}. Letting E′ =
∏
pEp × E′∞, we find γ(E′) = 2 · γ(E) because
γ(E′∞) = 2γ(E∞). So γ(E
′) < 1 if X < 2N1/d and we find as above that there is a polynomial h(x) ∈ Q[x]
whose roots contain every element of S(X)′. If X > 2N1/d then γ(E′) > 1 and S(X)′ is infinite by the main
result of [Rum13], so h(x) cannot exist.
4 Lattices of Binomial Polynomials
In this section, we will answer the question of whether Coppersmith’s theorem can be improved using auxiliary
polynomials that are combinations of binomial polynomials. The results we proved in §3 showed that it is
impossible to improve the bounds for auxiliary polynomials of the form h(x) =
∑
i,j≥0 ai,jx
i(f(x)/N)j .
Recall that if i ≥ 0 is an integer, the binomial polynomial bi(x) is
bi(x) = x · (x− 1) · · · (x− i+ 1)/i!.
Based on a suggestion by Howgrave-Graham and Lenstra, Coppersmith considered in [Cop01] auxiliary
polynomials constructed from binomial polynomials; that is, of the form
h(x) =
∑
i,j≥0
ai,jbi(x)bj(f(x)/N). (9)
He found that was he unable to improve the bound of N1/d using this alternate lattice. In this section we
will prove some sharper forms of Theorems 3 and 4 that explain why this is the case.
Following the method laid out in §3, we find that capacity theory cannot rule out the existence of such
polynomials. One of the key differences is that monomials send algebraic integers to algebraic integers, while
binomial polynomials do not because of the denominators. Therefore, we are no longer able to use the same
sets Ep as in the previous section.
In fact, if one uses the lattice of binomial polynomials of the form (9), then for any disk in C there
do exist auxiliary polynomials that have the required boundedness properties. This is in contrast to the
situation for polynomials constructed from the monomial lattice. In Theorem 19, we exhibit, for any disk,
an explicit construction of such a polynomial. However, since this polynomial is constructed with j = 0 in
(9), it tells us nothing about the solution to the inputs to Coppersmith’s theorem.
Theorem 21 shows that even if one manages to find an auxiliary polynomial in the lattice given by
(9) that does give nontrivial information about the solutions to the inputs to Coppersmith’s theorem, this
polynomial will still not be useful. Either this polynomial must have degree so large that the root-finding
step does not run in polynomial time, or N must have a small prime factor. For this reason, for N that has
only large prime factors, using auxiliary polynomials constructed using binomial polynomials will not lead
to an improvement in the N1/d bound in Coppersmith’s method.
Theorem 19 (Existence of bounded binomial polynomials). Suppose δ is any positive real number. Suppose
c > 1. For all sufficiently large integers N , there is a non-zero polynomial of the form
h(x) =
∑
0≤i≤cNδ
ai bi(x) (10)
with ai ∈ Z such that |h(z)| < 1 for all z in the complex disk {z ∈ C : |z| ≤ N δ}.
Theorem 20 (Explicit construction for Theorem 19). Suppose c > q0 = 3.80572... when q0 is the unique
positive real number such that
4arctan(q0/2) = q0
(
2 ln(2)− ln
(
4
q20
+ 1
))
(11)
Then one can exhibit an explicit h(x) of the kind in (19) in the following way. Choose any constant c′ with
q0 < c
′ < c. Then for sufficiently large N and all integers t in the range c′N δ/2 < t ≤ cN δ/2 − 1/2, the
function
h(x) = b2t+1(x+ t)
will have the properties in (i).
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Theorem 21 (Negative Coppersmith Theorem for binomial polynomials). Suppose ǫ > 0 and that M and
N are positive integers. Suppose further that
N ǫ >
∏
p≤M
p1/(p−1) (12)
where the product is over the primes p less than or equal to M . This condition holds, for example, if
1.48774N ǫ ≥M ≥ 319. If there is a non-zero polynomial h(x) of the form
h(x) =
∑
0≤i,j≤M
ai,j bi(x) bj(f(x)/N) (13)
with ai,j ∈ Z such that |h(z)| < 1 for z in the complex disk {z ∈ C : |z| ≤ N (1/d)+ǫ}, then N must have a
prime factor less than M .
4.1 Proof of Theorems 19 and 20.
The proof of Theorem 19 comes in several parts. We first use capacity theory to show that non-zero
polynomials of the desired kind exist. This argument does not give any information about the degree of the
polynomials, however. So we then use an explicit geometry of numbers argument to show the existence of a
non-zero polynomial of a certain bounded degree which is of the desired type. Finally, we give an explicit
construction of an h(x). This h(x) has a somewhat larger degree than the degree which the geometry of
numbers argument shows can be achieved. It would be interesting to see if the LLL algorithm would lead to
a polynomial time method for constructing a lower degree polynomial than the explicit construction.
In this section we assume the notations of Theorem 19. The criterion that h(x) be a polynomial of the
form
h(x) =
∑
i
aibi(x)
with ai ∈ Z is an extrinsic property, which will be discussed in more detail in Step 1 of §5.1. In short, this
extrinsic property arises because h(x) must have a particular form. We need to convert this to an intrinsic
criterion, in this case observing that these polynomials take Zp to Zp. The key to doing so is the following
result of Polya:
Theorem 22. (Polya) The set of polynomials h(x) ∈ Q[x] which have integral values on every rational
integer r ∈ Z is exactly the set of integral combinations ∑i aibi(x) of binomial polynomials bi(x).
Corollary 4.2. The set of polynomials h(x) ∈ Q[x] which are integral combinations ∑i aibi(x) of binomial
polynomials bi(x) is exactly the set of h(x) such that |h(z)|p ≤ 1 for all z ∈ Zp and all primes p.
Proof. Suppose first that |h(z)|p ≤ 1 for all z ∈ Zp and all primes p. Since each integer z lies in Zp for all
primes p, we conclude that if z is an integer then the rational number h(z) lies in Zp for all p. Because
Z = Q ∩ (∩pZp) this shows h(x) takes integers to integers. Conversely, suppose h(x) ∈ Q[x] takes integers
to integers and that p is a prime. Since z → h(z) defines a continuous function of z ∈ Zp and Z is dense in
Zp, we conclude that h(z) ∈ Zp if z ∈ Zp.
Our main goal in the proof of Theorem 19 is to show there are h(x) 6= 0 as in Corollary 4.2 such that
|h(z)| < 1 for z in the complex disk E∞ = {z ∈ C : |z| ≤ N δ}.
We break reaching this goal into steps.
Applying capacity theory directly.
In view of Corollary 4.2, the natural adelic set to consider would be
E =
∏
p
Ep × E∞ with Ep = Zp for all p (14)
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However, this choice does not meet the criteria for γ(E) to be well defined, because it is not true that Ep = Zp
for all but finitely many p. However, for all Y ≥ 2, the adelic set
E′ =
∏
p≤Y
Zp ×
∏
p>Y
Zp × E∞ (15)
does satisfy the criteria for γ(E) to be well defined. One has
γp(Zp) = p
−1/(p−1), γp(Zp) = 1 and γ∞(E∞) = N
δ.
So
ln γ(E′) = ln

∏
p≤Y
γp(Zp)× γ∞(E∞)

 = −∑
p≤Y
ln(p)
p− 1 + ln(N
δ) (16)
Here as Y →∞, the quantity −∑p≤Y ln(p)p−1 diverges to −∞. So for all sufficiently large Y we have γ(E′) < 1.
We then find as before that Cantor’s work produces a non-zero polynomial h(x) ∈ Q[x] such that for all v
and all elements z of the v-component of E′ one has |h(z)|v ≤ 1, with |h(z)| < 1 if v = ∞. In particular,
|h(z)|p ≤ 1 for all primes p and all z ∈ Zp ⊂ Zp. So Corollary 4.2 shows h(x) is an integral combination of
binomial polynomials such that |h(z)| < 1 if z ∈ C and |z| ≤ N δ.
Using the geometry of numbers to control the degree of auxiliary polynomials
Minkowski’s theorem says that if L is a lattice in a Euclidean space Rn and C is a convex symmetric
subset of Rn of volume at least equal to 2n times the generalized index [L : Zn], there must be a non-zero
element of L∩C. To apply this to construct auxiliary polynomials, one takes C to correspond to a suitably
bounded set of polynomials with real coefficients, and L to correspond to those polynomials with rational
coefficients of the kind one is trying to construct.
In the case at hand, suppose 1 ≤ r ∈ R. Let Z[x]≤r be the set of integral polynomials of degree ≤ r,
and let L≤r be the Z-span of {bi(x) : 0 ≤ i ≤ r, i ∈ Z}. To show the first statement of Theorem 19, it will
suffice to show that if c > 1, then for sufficiently large r = N δ > 0, there is a non-zero f(x) ∈ L≤cr such
that |f(z)| < 1 for z ∈ C such that |z| ≤ r.
Let m = ⌊cr⌋ be the largest integer less than or equal to cr. By considering leading coefficients, we have
ln[L≤m : Z[x]≤m] = ln
m∏
i=0
i! = m2 ln(m)/2 · (1 + o(1))
where o(1)→ 0 as m→∞. Let C be the set of polynomials with real coefficients of the form
m∑
i=0
qi(x/r)
i with |qi| ≤ 1/(m+ 2).
We consider C as a convex symmetric subset of Rm+1 by mapping a polynomial to its vector of coefficients.
Then
ln vol(C) = (m+ 1) · (ln(2)− ln(m+ 2))−
m∑
i=0
i ln(r) = − ln(r)m2/2 · (1 + o(1)).
Since Z[x]≤m maps to a lattice in R
m+1 with covolume 1, we find
ln vol(C)− ln vol(Rm+1/L≤m) ≥ (ln(m)− ln(r))m2/2 · (1 + o(1)) = ln(c) ·m2/2 · (1 + o(1)).
Since ln(c) > 0, for sufficiently large m, the right hand side is greater than 2 ln(m+ 1). Hence Minkowski’s
Theorem produces a non-zero f(x) ∈ L≤m in C. One has
|f(z)| ≤
m∑
i=0
|z/r|i/(m+ 2) < 1
if z ∈ C and |z| < r, so we have proved Theorem 19.
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An explicit construction
Theorem 20 concerns the polynomials b2t+1(x + t) when t > 0 is an integer. This polynomial takes
integral values at integral x, so it is an integral combination of the polynomials bi(x) with 0 ≤ i ≤ 2t + 1
by Polya’s Theorem 22. To finish the proof of Theorem 20, it will suffice to show the following. Let q0
is the unique positive solution of the equation (11), and suppose q > q0. Let D(r) be the closed disk
D(r) = {z ∈ C : |z| ≤ r}. We will show that if r is sufficiently large, then
|b2t+1(z + t)| < 1 if 2t ≥ qr and z ∈ D(r). (17)
We have
b2t+1(z + t) =
∏2t
j=0(z + t− j)
(2t+ 1)!
=
∏t
j=−t(z − j)
(2t+ 1)!
= ±z ·
∏t
j=1(z
2 − j2)
(2t+ 1)!
For j ≥ 0 and z ∈ D(r) we have
| − r2 − j2| = r2 + j2 ≥ |z2 − j2|.
So
sup({b2t+t(z + t) : z ∈ D(r)}) =
r ·∏tj=1(r2 + j2)
(2t+ 1)!
.
Taking logarithms gives
ln sup({b2t+t(z + t) : z ∈ D(r)}) = ln(r) +
t∑
j=1
ln(r2 + j2)− ln((2t+ 1)!). (18)
We now suppose t ≥ r, so ξ = r/t ≤ 1. Then
t∑
j=1
ln(r2 + j2) = t ln(t2) + t · 1
t
t∑
j=1
ln(ξ2 + (j/t)2)
= 2t ln(t) + t ·
∫ 1
0
ln(ξ2 + s2)ds+ o(t) (19)
as t→∞. By integration by parts,
∫
ln(ξ2 + s2)ds = s ln(ξ2 + s2)− 2s+ 2ξarctan(s/ξ). (20)
By Sterling’s formula,
ln((2t+ 1)!) = (2t+ 1) ln(2t+ 1)− (2t+ 1) + o(t) = 2t ln(t) + 2t ln(2)− 2t+ o(t). (21)
Since ln(r) = o(t), we get from (18), (20) and (21) that
ln(sup{b2t+t(z + t) : z ∈ D(r)}) = t · (ln(ξ2 + 1) + 2ξarctan(ξ−1)− 2 ln(2)) + o(t). (22)
Writing q = 2t/r = 2/ξ ≥ 2 and multiplying both sides of (22) by q > 0, we see that if
f(q) = q ln
(
4
q2
+ 1
)
+ 4arctan(q/2)− 2 ln(2)q < 0
then for sufficiently large t the supremum on the left in (18) is negative and we have the desired bound. Here
from q ≥ 2 we have
f ′(q) = ln(1/q2 + 1/4) ≤ ln(1/2) < 0 < f(2) and lim
q→+∞
f(q) = −∞.
So there is a unique positive real number q0 with f(q0) = 0, and f(q) < 0 for q > q0. This establishes (17)
and finishes the proof of part (ii) of Theorem 19.
15
4.3 Proof of Theorem 21
The proof of Theorem 21 uses a feedback procedure. The feedback in this case is that if N has no small
prime factor p, then for all small primes p we can increase the set Ep. This is described in more detail in
§5.2.
Let M be a positive integer and suppose ǫ > 0. Suppose that there is a polynomial of the form
h(x) =
∑
0≤i,j≤M
ai,jbi(x)bj(f(x)/N) (23)
such that ai,j ∈ Z and |h(z)| < 1 for all z ∈ C such that |z| ≤ N1/d+ǫ. We show that if M satisfies one of the
inequalities involving N in the statement of Theorem 21, then N must have a prime divisor bounded above
by M . We will argue by contradiction. Thus we need to show that the following hypothesis cannot hold:
Hypothesis 23. No prime p ≤M divides N , and either (12) holds or 1.48774N ǫ ≥M ≥ 319.
The point of the proof is to show that Hypothesis (23) leads to h(x) having small sup norms on all
components of an adelic set E which has capacity larger than 1. The reason that the hypothesis that no
prime p ≤ M divides N enters into the argument is that this guarantees that f(z)/N will lie in the p-adic
integers Zp for all z ∈ Zp when p ≤ M . This will lead to being able to take the component of E at such p
to be Zp. The p-adic capacity of Zp is p
−1/(p−1), as noted in Fact 14. This turns out to be relatively large
when one applies various results from analytic number theory to get lower bounds on capacities.
To start a more detailed proof, let p be a prime and suppose 0 ≤ i, j ≤M .
Lemma 24. If p ≤M set Ep = Zp. Then |h(z)|p ≤ 1 if z ∈ Ep and the capacity γp(Ep) equals p−1/(p−1)|N |p.
Proof. If p ≤M and x ∈ Zp, then bi(x) ∈ Zp since Z is dense in Zp and bi(x) ∈ Z for all x ∈ Z. Furthermore,
f(x)/N ∈ Zp for x ∈ Zp since we have assumed N is prime to p and f(x) ∈ Z[x]. Therefore bj(f(x)/N) ∈ Zp
for all j. Since the coefficients ai,j in (23) are integers, we conclude |h(z)|p ≤ 1. We remarked earlier in Fact
14 that γp(Zp) = p
−1/(p−1). Since p ≤M , we have supposed that p does not divide N . So |N |p = 1, and we
get γp(Ep) = γ(Zp) = p
−1/(p−1)|N |p.
Lemma 25. If p > M set Ep = f
−1(NZp). Then |h(z)|p ≤ 1 if z ∈ Ep and γp(Ep) = |N |−1/pp .
Proof. We first note that 0 ≤ i, j ≤ M < p implies that |i!|p = |j!|p = 1. Recall that Zp = {x ∈ Qp : |x|p ≤
1}. If x ∈ f−1(NZp) then x ∈ Zp since f(x) is monic with integral coefficients. So
|bi(x)|p = |x · (x − 1) · · · (x− i+ 1)|p|i!|p ≤ 1
and
|bj(f(x)/N)|p = |f(x)/N · (f(x)/N − 1) · · · (f(x)/N − j + 1)|p|j!|p ≤ 1
since x − k and f(x)/N − k lie in Zp for all integers k and |i!|p = |j!|p = 1. Because the ai,j in (2) are
integral, we conclude |h(z)|p ≤ 1 if z ∈ Ep = f−1(NZp). The capacity γp(Ep) is |N |−1/pp by Fact 15.
Lemma 26. Set E∞ = {z ∈ C : |z| ≤ N1/d+ǫ}. Then |h(z)|∞ < 1 if z ∈ E∞ and γ∞(E∞) = N1/d+ǫ.
Proof. This first statement was one of our hypotheses on h(x), while γ∞(E∞) = N
1/d+ǫ by Fact 14.
We conclude from these Lemmas and Fact 16 that when
E =
∏
p
Ep × E∞
we have
γ(E) =

∏
p≤M
p−1/(p−1)

×

∏
all p
|N |1/dp

 ×N1/d+ǫ =

∏
p≤M
p−1/(p−1)

N ǫ. (24)
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Here
ln

∏
p≤M
p−1/(p−1)

 = − ∑
p≤M
ln(p)
p− 1
and it follows from [RS62, Theorem 6, p. 70] that if M ≥ 319 then
−
∑
p≤M
ln(p)
p− 1 = −
∑
p≤M
ln(p)
p
−
∑
p≤M
ln(p)
p(p− 1)
≥ −
∑
p≤M
ln(p)
p
−
∑
p
∞∑
n=2
ln(p)
pn
≥ − ln(M) + γ − 1
ln(M)
(25)
where γ = 0.57721... is Euler’s constant.
Hence (24) gives
ln(γ(E)) = −
∑
p≤M
ln(p)
p− 1 + ǫ ln(N) ≥ − ln(M) + γ −
1
ln(M)
+ ǫ ln(N). (26)
The right hand side is positive if
N ǫ · eγ−1/ ln(M) > M. (27)
Since we assumed M ≥ 319, we have eγ−1/ ln(M) ≥ 1.497445... and so (27) will hold if
1.48744 ·N ǫ > M (28)
In any case, if the left hand side of (26) is positive then γ(E) > 1. However, we have shown that h(x)
is a non-zero polynomial in Q[x] such that |h(x)|v ≤ 1 for all v when x ∈ Ev with strict inequality when
v = ∞. By Cantor’s Theorem 17, such an h(x) cannot exist because γ(E) > 1. The contradiction shows
that Hypothesis 23 cannot hold, and this completes the proof of Theorem 21.
5 A field guide for capacity-theoretic arguments
The proofs in §3 and §4 illustrate how capacity theory can be used to show the nonexistence and existence
of polynomials with certain properties. This paper is a first step toward building a more general framework
to apply capacity theory to cryptographic applications. In this section, we step back and summarize how
capacity theory can be used in general to show either that auxiliary polynomials with various desirable
properties do or do not exist.
The procedure for applying capacity theory to such problems allows for feedback between the type of
polynomials one seeks and the computation of the relevant associated capacities. If it turns out that the
capacity theoretic computations are not sufficient for a definite conclusion, they may suggest additional
hypotheses either on the polynomials or on auxiliary parameters which would be useful to add in order to
arrive at a definitive answer. They may also suggest some alternative proof methods which will succeed even
when capacity theory used as a black box does not.
5.1 Showing auxiliary polynomials exist
To use capacity theory to show that polynomials h(x) ∈ Q[x] with certain properties exist, one can follow
these steps:
Step 1. State the conditions on h(x) which one would like to achieve. These can be of an intrinsic or an
extrinsic nature.
(a) Intrinsic conditions have the following form:
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(i) For each prime p, one should give a subset Ep of Qp. For all but finitely many p, Ep must be
the set Zp.
(ii) One should give a subset E∞ of C.
(iii) The set of polynomials h(x) ∈ Q[x] one seeks are all polynomials such that |h(z)|p ≤ 1 for all
primes p and all z ∈ Ep and |h(w)| < 1 if w ∈ E∞.
(b) To state conditions on h(x) extrinsically, one writes down the type of polynomial expressions one
allows. For example, one might require h(x) to be an integral combination of integer multiples of
specified polynomials, e.g. monomials in x as in Theorem 13. Suppose one uses such an extrinsic
description, and one is trying to show the existence of h(x) of this form using capacity theory. It
is then necessary to come up with an intrinsic description of the above kind with the property
that any h(x) meeting the intrinsic conditions must have the required extrinsic description. We
saw another example of this in §4 on binomial polynomials; see also Step 5 below.
Step 2. Suppose we have stated an intrinsic condition on h(x) as in parts (i), (ii) and (iii) of Step 1(a). One
then needs to check that the adelic set E =
∏
pEp×E∞ satisfies certain standard hypotheses specified
in [Can80] and [Rum89, Rum13]. These ensure that the capacity
γ(E) =
∏
p
γp(Ep) · γ∞(E∞) (29)
is well defined. One then needs to employ [Can80] and [Rum89, Rum13] to find an upper bounds the
γp(Ep), on γ∞(E∞) and then on γ(E). This may also require results from analytic number theory
concerning the distribution of primes. When using this method theoretically, there may be an issue
concerning the computational complexity of finding such upper bounds. However, if Ep and E∞ have
a simple form (e.g. if they are disks), explicit formulas are available. Notice that the requirement in
part (i) of Step 1 that Ep = Zp for all but finitely many p forces γp(Ep) = 1 for all but finitely many
p. So the product on the right side of (29) is well defined as long as γ∞(E∞) and γp(Ep) are for all p.
Step 3. If the computation in Step 2 shows γ(E) < 1, capacity theory guarantees that there is some non-
zero polynomial h(x) ∈ Q[x] which satisfies the bounds in part (iii) of Step 1. However, one has no
information at this point about the degree of h(x).
Step 4. Suppose that Step 2 shows γ(E) < 1 and that we want to show there is an h(x) as in Step 3
satisfying a certain bound on its degree. There are three levels of looking for such degree bounds.
a. The most constructive method is to present an explicit construction of an h(x) which one can
show works. We did this in the previous section in the case of integral combinations of binomial
polynomials.
b. The second most constructive method is to convert the existence of h(x) into the problem of
finding a short vector in a suitable lattice of polynomials and to apply the LLL algorithm. One
needs to show that the LLL criteria are met once one considers polynomials of a sufficiently large
degree, and that a short vector will meet the intrinsic criteria on h(x). We will return in later
papers to the general question of when γ(E) < 1 implies that there is a short vector problem
whose solution via LLL will meet the intrinsic criteria. This need not always be the case. The
reason is that in the geometry of numbers, one can find large complicated convex symmetric sets
which are very far from being generalized ellipsoids. However, in practice, the statement that
γ(E) < 1 makes it highly likely that the above LLL approach will succeed.
c. Because of the definition of sectional capacity in [Chi91] and [RLV00], the following approach
is guaranteed to succeed by γ(E) < 1. Minkowski’s Theorem in the geometry of numbers will
produce (in a non-explicit manner) a polynomial h(x) of large degree m which meets the intrinsic
criteria. One can estimate how large m must be by computing certain volumes and generalized
indices. We illustrate such computations in §4 in the case of intrinsic conditions satisfied by
integral combination of binomial polynomials.
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Step 5. It can happen that the most natural choices for Ep and E∞ in step 1 above do not satisfy all the
criteria for the capacity of E =
∏
pEp × E∞ to be well defined. One can then adjust these choices
slightly. To obtain more control on the degrees of auxiliary functions, one can try an explicit Minkowski
argument of the kind use in the proof of the positive result concerning integral combinations of binomial
polynomials in Theorem 19 above.
5.2 Showing auxiliary polynomials do not exist
To use capacity theory to show that polynomials h(x) ∈ Q[x] with certain properties do not exist, one can
follow these steps:
Step 1. Specify the set of properties you want h(x) to have. Then show that the following is true for every
h(x) with these properties:
(i) For each prime p, exhibit a set Ep of Qp such that |h(z)|p ≤ 1 if z ∈ Ep. For all but finitely many
p, Ep must be the set Zp.
(ii) Exhibit a closed subset E∞ of C such that |h(z)| < 1 if z ∈ E∞.
It is important that h(x) ∈ Q[x] with the desired properties meet the criteria in (i) and (ii).
Step 2. As before, one needs to check that the adelic set E =
∏
p Ep × E∞ satisfies certain standard
hypotheses specified in [Can80] and [Rum89, Rum13]. These ensure that the capacity
γ(E) =
∏
p
γp(Ep) · γ∞(E∞) (30)
is well defined. One then needs to find a lower bound on γ(E) using lower bounds on the γp(Ep) and
on γ∞(E∞). One may also require information from analytic number theory, e.g. on the distributions
of prime numbers less than a given bound.
Step 3. If the computation in Step 2 shows γ(E) > 1, capacity theory guarantees that there is no non-zero
polynomial h(x) ∈ Q[x] which satisfies the intrinsic conditions (i) and (ii) of Step 1. This means there
do not exist of polynomials h(x) having the original list of properties.
Step 4. Suppose that in Step 3, we cannot show γ(E) > 1 due to the fact that the sets Ep and E∞ in Step
1 are not sufficient large. One can now change the original criteria on h(x), or take into account some
additional information, to try to enlarge the sets Ep and E∞ for which Step 1 applies. We saw in the
previous section how this procedure works in the case of integral combinations of certain products of
binomial polynomials. For example, if one assumes that certain other parameters (e.g. the modulus of
a congruence) have no small prime factors, one can enlarge the sets Ep in Step 1 which are associated
to small primes.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we drew a new connection between two disparate research areas: lattice-based techniques for
cryptanalysis and capacity theory. This connection has benefits for researchers in both areas.
• Capacity Theory for cryptographers: We have shown that techniques from capacity theory can be
used to show that the bound obtained by Coppersmith’s method in the case of univariate polynomials
is optimal for a broad class of techniques. This implies that the best available class of techniques for
solving these types of problems cannot be extended. This has implications for cryptanalysis, and the
tightness of cryptographic security reductions.
• Cryptography for capacity theorists: Capacity theory provides a method for calculating the
conditions under which certain auxiliary polynomials exist. Coppersmith’s method provides an efficient
algorithm for finding these auxiliary polynomials. Until this time, capacity theory has not addressed
the computational complexity of producing auxilary functions when they do exist.
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Concretely, we used capacity theory to answer three questions of Coppersmith in [Cop01]
1. Can the exponent 1/d be improved (possibly through improved lattice reduction techniques)? No, the
desired auxiliary polynomial simply does not exist.
2. Does restricting attention to the real line [−N−1/d, N1/d] instead of the complex disk |z| ≤ N1/d
improve the situation? No.
3. Does considering lattices based on binomial polynomials improve the situation? No, these lattices have
the desired auxiliary polynomials, but for RSA moduli, their degree is too large to be useful.
Since Coppersmith’s method is one of the primary tools in asymmetric cryptanalysis, these results give
an indication of the security of many factoring-based cryptosystems.
This paper lays a foundation for several directions of future work. Coppersmith’s study of small integral
solutions of equations in two variables and bivariate equations modulo N [Cop97] is related to capacity theory
on curves, as developed by Rumely in [Rum89, Rum13]. The extension of Coppersmith’s method to multivari-
ate equations [JM06, Jut98] is connected to capacity theory on higher dimensional varieties, as developed in
[Chi91], [RLV00] and [CMBPT15]. Multivariate problems raise deep problems in arithmetic geometry about
the existence of finite morphisms to projective spaces which are bounded on specified archimedean and non-
archimedean sets. Interestingly, Howgrave-Graham’s extension of Coppersmith’s method to find small roots
of modular equations modulo unknown moduli [HG01, May10] appears to pertain to joint capacities of many
adelic sets, a topic which has not been developed to our knowledge in the capacity theory literature. It is an
intriguing question whether capacity theory can be extended to help us understand the limitations of these
more general variants of Coppersmith’s method.
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